Archaea are microorganisms that are distinct from bacteria and eukaryotes. They are prevalent in extreme environments, and yet found in most ecosystems. They are a natural component of the microbiota of most, if not all, humans and other animals. Despite their ubiquity and close association with humans, animals and plants, no pathogenic archaea have been identified. Because no archaeal pathogens have yet been identified, there is a general assumption that archaeal pathogens do not exist. This review examines whether this is (...) a good assumption by investigating the potential for archaea to be or become pathogens. This is achieved by addressing: the diversity of archaea versus known pathogens, opportunities for archaea to demonstrate pathogenicity and be detected as pathogens, reports linking archaea with disease, and immune responses to archaea. In addition, molecular and genomic data are examined for the presence of systems utilised in pathogenesis. The view of this report is that, although archaea can presently be described as non‐pathogenic, they have the potential to be (discovered as) pathogens. The present optimistic view that there are no archaeal pathogens is tainted by a severe lack of relevant knowledge, which may have important consequences in the future. BioEssays 25:1119–1128, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Physical activity and sedentary behaviour have been linked to the mental health of children and adolescents, yet the timing of behaviours may play a role in this relationship and clarifying this could inform interventions. We explored cross-sectional associations of PA and SED in varying time segments throughout the school day with the mental health of school-aged children and adolescents from rural Northeastern Ontario, Canada. A total of 161 students wore accelerometers for 8 days and completed a self-report survey. Mental health (...) was measured using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. Accelerometer-measured SED, light PA, and moderate and vigorous PA were estimated in the time-segments before school, school time, after school, and evenings. Associations were tested with multilevel linear regressions while adjusting for confounding factors. Students spent 72.6 min in MVPA, 209.0 min in LPA, and 621.0 min in SED per day. Daily SED was associated with less conduct problems. Evening LPA was inversely associated with hyperactivity, while SED was associated with hyperactivity and with peer problems before school, and during school. No associations were observed for MVPA, emotional symptoms, or prosocial behaviour. In conclusion, displacing SED with LPA in some specific periods of the day may benefit the mental health of students; taking this into account could strengthen interventions. (shrink)

The present studies examined whether implied tactile properties during language comprehension influence subsequent direct tactile perception, and the specificity of any such effects. Participants read sentences that implicitly conveyed information regarding tactile properties (e.g., Grace tried on a pair of thick corduroy pants while shopping) that were either related or unrelated to fabrics and varied in implied texture (smooth, medium, rough). After reading each sentence, participants then performed an unrelated rating task during which they felt and rated the texture of (...) a presented fabric. Results demonstrated that the texture properties implied in sentences influence direct tactile perception. Specifically, after reading about a smooth or rough texture, subsequent fabric ratings became notably smoother or rougher, respectively. However, we also show that there was some specificity to these effects: Fabric-related sentences elicited more specific and interactive effects on subsequent ratings. Together, we demonstrate that under certain circumstances, language comprehension can prime tactile representations and affect direct tactile perception. Results are discussed with regard to the nature and scope of multimodal mental simulation during reading. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Plato's Later Epistemology. By W. G. Runciman. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. 138. $3.75.) Although this work may be regarded as the sequel to an earlier article by the author ("Plato's Parmenides," in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXIV [1959], 89-120), his argument in this volume does not hinge upon the earlier analysis of the Parmenides. What Runciman proposes to do (and not do) is (...) made clear enough both in the Introduction and in his concluding remarks. His purpose is "to consider the logic and epistemology of Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist" (p. 1), to "give a coherent interpretation of [these dialogues] as a whole" (p. 127), and to show something of Plato's later attitude to the general problem of knowledge and truth. But this is done within the context of a reading of Plato and of Plato's concern with knowledge, truth, and error, marked by the raising of two particular questions--of interest to Runciman and to a great many others belong-' 9 ing to the Anglo-American tradition in philosophy. Accordingly, the interpretation of these two dialogues is presented as an attempt to throw light on just "how far did Plato arri~,e at a distinction between knowledge that, knowledge how, and knowledge by acquaintance?" And secondly, "how closely did he approach a conscious formulation of the notion of truth-value?" (p. 1). The vantage point for Runciman's interpretation of these dialogues is the not unfamiliar view of Plato's "later" works as being marked by an increasing selfcriticism of his earlier theories, that it is by the method of Division (rather than the method of Hypothesis) that Plato now undertakes his exposition of the Forms. And the Forms are now seen, no longer "as the isolated objects of hypothesis and deduction... [but rather as] members of a complicated structure of mutual interrelations" (p. 128). Here then, for Runciman, Plato appears as the philosopher of later years, as more the dialectician, less concerned with contemplation of the Forms than with correlation and the knowledge of the relational properties which the Forms possess. Plato is thus seen by Runciman as coming of philosophical age in these, the "later" dialogues. And if Plato is not the forerunner of the contemporary philosophy-of-language school or a sainted forefather of those who are convinced that progress has been made in philosophy in the name of "logical analysis," at least these "later" Platonic dialogues show the brilliance of a philosopher, Plato, who could have said such new and interesting things for philosophers today, and yet "within the framework of his misguided... Theory of Forms" (p. 133). The important assumption, for Runciman, is to recognize the gradual development and modification of earlier views by a Plato grown more "sophisticated" by the maturity of his later years. And Runciman enters upon an interpretation of the Theaetetus and the Sophist with this clearly in mind, and with the comment that these dialogues may best be understood in this way: that--however crippled philosophically by his adherence to the Forms--Plato is latterly struggling with philosophical problems of logic and language. Runciman's argument, within such a context, emphasizes the role of the Sophist: had Plato but understood clearly his subject-matter, this dialogue pre-eminently suggests how he might have broken through to the full vigor of a [contemporary] concern with the nature and structure of language. "If a philosopher can be said to be doing logic without knowing it, then we may say that Plato in the Sophist is doing logic" (p. 126). Runciman's little book, thus primarily concerned, contains chapters on the logic and epistemology of the Theaetetus and the Sophist, and he raises some interesting questions. E255] 256 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The book is both stimulating and provocative, and rather worth the reading, particularly by those who find Plato less philosophically "sophisticated" than Aristotle, less alert and relevant for some contemporary philosophical tastes. And it may be, of course, that some such readers will be led on to a larger sampling of the Platonic dialogues, with the result-doubtless pernicious---that their reading of Plato may corrupt their "understanding" of... (shrink)

The American idealist movement started in St. Louis, Missouri in 1858, becoming more influential as women joined and influenced its development. Susan Elizabeth Blow was well known as an educator and pedagogical theorist who founded the first public kindergarten program in America (1873-1884). Anna C. Brackett was a feminist and pedagogical theorist and the first female principal of a secondary school (St. Louis Normal School, 1863-72). Grace C. Bibb was a feminist literary critic and the first female dean at the (...) University of Missouri, Columbia (1878-84). American idealism took on a new form in the 1880s with the founding of the Concord School of Philosophy in Massachusetts. Ellen M. Mitchell participated in the movement in both St. Louis and Concord. She was one of the first women to teach philosophy at a co-educational college (University of Denver, 1890-92). Lucia Ames Mead, Marietta Kies, and Eliza Sunderland joined the movement in Concord. Lucia Ames Mead became a chief pacifist theorist in the early twentieth century. Kies and Sunderland were among the first women to earn the Ph.D. in philosophy (University of Michigan, 1891, 1892). Kies wrote on political altruism and shared with Mitchell the distinction of teaching at a coeducational institution (Butler College, 1896-99). These were the first American women as a group to plunge into philosophy proper, bridging those years between the amateur, paraprofessional and professional academic philosopher. Dorothy Rogers's new book at last gives them the attention they deserve. America's First Women Philosophers is indexed in H.W. Wilson's Essay and General Literature Index. (shrink)

This book traces the career development and influence on American intellectual life of the first twenty women to earn a PhD in philosophy in the United States. Rogers explores the factors that led these women to pursue careers in academic philosophy, examines the ideas they developed, and evaluates the impact they had on the academic and social worlds they inhabited. This volume investigates not only the success stories of such women as Eliza Ritchie, Julia Gulliver, and Christine Ladd-Franklin, to (...) name a few, but also the policies and practices that made it difficult or impossible for others to succeed. (shrink)

Any division between scientific practice and a metalevel of the methods and goals of science is largely a false dichotomy. Since a priori, foundationist or logicist approaches to normative principles have proven unequal to the task of representing actual scientific practice, methodologies of science must be abstracted from episodes in the history of science. Of course, it is possible that such characteristics could prove universal and constant across various eras. But, case studies show that they are not in anything beyond (...) the strictures applied to everyday, commonsense reasoning (e.g., a requirement of noncontradiction in a deductive argument). Hence, even if some presently-on-offer methodology or description of past scientific practice were adequate, it need not remain so for current (‘frontier’) areas of science. For this reason, it is important to examine recent episodes in, say, high-energy physics. Results from case studies of several episodes in that field are used to argue that successful practice leads scientists to countenance essential changes in the methodological framework at the levels of the criteria employed in judging theories (i.e., what counts for an explanation and what are canons of rationality) and of the goals of science. *Partial support for this research was provided by the History and Philosophy of Science Program of the National Science Foundation under grants Nos. SES-8606472 and SES-8705469. A preliminary version of this paper was given at an HPS seminar at King's College, London University in May 1988. Helpful comments and useful criticisms were made by several colleagues, especially Ernan McMullin, Heinz Post and Simon Saunders (none of whom are to be held responsible for or necessarily even in agreement with the views expressed here.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 96-112 [Access article in PDF] A Theory of Fiction A. P. Martinich What is the chief linguistic difference between fiction and nonfiction? My answer, in brief, is that in fiction the Supermaxim of Quality, "Do not participate in a speech act unless you can satisfy all the conditions for its nondefective performance," is suspended. My thesis depends on a modified version of H. P. (...) Grice's theory of conversation. In saying that the Supermaxim of Quality is suspended in fiction, I do not mean that no speech acts are performed. On the contrary, many are; some of them are the same as those that would be performed in a nonfictional context. Sometimes ordinary statements and requests are made, and questions are asked in fiction, as we shall see in section II. However, many of the speech acts performed in fiction are made possible by the fact that the Supermaxim is suspended, and thus the normal consequences of performing and evaluating the speech acts are not in force. This will also be explained in section II.On the one hand, since my theory depends on a more general theory of language, those who accept the general theory will have further evidence of its power, while some of those who do not accept it may be more inclined to if they see that it smoothly accounts for fiction. On the other hand, those who do not accept the more general theory may be reluctant to see any merit in my theory. In addition, because of the almost universal acceptance among Anglo-American philosophers of the Axiom of Existence, which holds that everything referred to must exist, my rejection of that axiom may disincline some philosophers to accept the present theory of fiction. I discuss the axiom in section III. [End Page 96] I Before presenting my theory, there are two preliminary matters to discuss. The first involves the distinction between talk-in-fiction, talk-about-fiction, and talk-about-reality.Talk-in-fiction is the talk or writing that constitutes fictional works, e.g., the sentences in Ordinary People. But the preceding sentence is an example of talk about fiction: I said something about the fictional work Ordinary People. Whenever a philosopher discusses fiction, he uses talk about fiction to explain talk in fiction. Some philosophers give the impression that the terms talk-in-fiction and talk-about-fiction are mutually exclusive. But they are not. When one novel talks about another, talk-in-fiction is also talk-about-fiction. In Judith Guest's Ordinary People, the narrator says, "He had thought about being a Soldier of Fortune, after reading The Three Musketeers."The terms talk-in-fiction and talk-about-reality are also not mutually exclusive and hence do not form a proper distinction. Many novels, including historical ones, talk about reality. The first sentence of Gore Vidal's Burr is "Shortly before midnight, July 1, 1833, Colonel Aaron Burr, aged seventy-seven, married Eliza Jumel, born Bowen...." What Vidal has written is true and intended to be true about the real world. In the "Afterword," he talks about his "meticulous" research and notes that he "tried to keep to the known facts." Thus, if he were wrong about Burr's late marriage or about many other things, he would be liable to criticism, even though he is not required to make every statement in the novel historically accurate.Historical novels are not the only ones that talk about reality. The first sentence of Leo Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, "Happy families are all happy in the same way, unhappy families unhappy in their separate, different ways," is a real statement made in fiction about real families as much as fictional ones. 1 Tolstoy is not pretending to make the statement he would be making if he were writing an essay or sociological treatise. He is simply making a statement about happy and unhappy families. We learn or, at least, are induced to think about a feature of the real world.Talk-in-fiction is sometimes referred to as "fictional talk," as if it... (shrink)

Analyses of factual causation face perennial problems, including preemption, overdetermination, and omissions. Arguably, the thorniest, are cases of omissive overdetermination, involving two independent omissions, each sufficient for the harm, and neither, independently, making a difference. A famous example is Saunders, where pedestrian was hit by a driver of a rental car who never pressed on the (unbeknownst to the driver) defective (and, negligently, never inspected) brakes. Causal intuitions in such cases are messy, reflected in disagreement about which omission mattered. (...) What these analyses mistakenly take for granted, is that at issue is the 'efficacy' of each omission. I argue, on the contrary, the puzzle of omissive overdetermination favors taking the act/omission distinction seriously. Factual causation, properly understood precludes omissions (i.e. omissions are not causal). Of course, the law also attaches liability to omissions, but this works differently from liability for real causes (e.g. omissions have a duty requirement, they also respond differentially to difference-making considerations). The manner in which liability attaches for omissions differs from that of straightforward causal liability, and is entirely dependent on the underlying causal structure. Attention to that structure (e.g. that the driver's hitting the pedestrian with his car is what actually caused the injury) sheds light on which omissions matter (e.g. driver's failure to press on the brakes) and why (because that failure removes a defense the driver would have to liability for the accident he caused). Other cases, where the parties' connection is entirely omissive (e.g. two physicians fail to detect independently lethal conditions), come out differently (tracking moralized elements). The analysis offered makes better sense of both why omissive determination cases are puzzling and how to resolve them. (shrink)

H G WellsHerbert George Wells, an English writer, was born on 21st 1866 and died on 13 Aug 1946. He was renowned for his works of science fiction especially 'The Time Machine'. He is also referred as 'The Father of Science Fiction'.

The human genome project's lasting legacies are the emerging insights into human physiology and disease, and the ascendance of biology as the dominant science of the 21st century. Sequencing revealed that >90% of the human genome is not coding for proteins, as originally thought, but rather is overwhelmingly transcribed into non‐protein coding, or non‐coding, RNAs (ncRNAs). This discovery initially led to the hypothesis that most genomic DNA is “junk”, a term still championed by some geneticists and evolutionary biologists. In contrast, (...) molecular biologists and biochemists studying the vast number of transcripts produced from most of this genome “junk” often surmise that these ncRNAs have biological significance. What gives? This essay contrasts the two opposing, extant viewpoints, aiming to explain their bases, which arise from distinct reference frames of the underlying scientific disciplines. Finally, it aims to reconcile these divergent mindsets in hopes of stimulating synergy between scientific fields. (shrink)

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing of (...) action, starting with “What Is Historical Meaningfulness?” and ending with “How Can History Have an Aim?” Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action. (shrink)

Ancient allures the postmodern social subject trapped in the strangeness of time—the time after the end of history. For that time-beaten subject ancient is the unconscious of coherence, predictability, and certainty. Or perhaps that ancient is a glory fled. Whatsoever, ancient is generally sacralized—irrespective of the type of socialization that happened in the past—and journey to the ancient is often deemed to be a pilgrimage. When ideas of the ancient in their individuality and totality inter alia become the natural intellectual (...) resource for rebuilding postmodern societies, discriminative ingenuity becomes an essential faculty. Any uncritical reverence of the ancient becomes antithetical to modern social and political values, inviting the risk of reproducing inequities of the past. This article problematizes such uncritical dependence on the ancient using Ancient Indian Jurisprudence, which has been looked up on as a repository of moral and legal values, as a case in point. It meditates from the experiences and perspectives of an imaginary ‘teaching subject’ on the many pitfalls and possibilities of the ancient as it builds a framework of teaching and learning, and a representative scheme of evaluation for Ancient Indian Jurisprudence. (shrink)

Este artigo visa apresentar uma taxonomia original dos argumentos mais difundidos contra o Princípio de Identidade dos Indiscerníveis ao longo da história da Filosofia, mas focando em versões defendidas no século XX e XXI; bem como uma taxonomia das respostas mais efetivas para esses argumentos usados no início do século XXI com uma breve avaliação sobre quais são as mais efetivas para cada argumento de ataque. O leitor também encontrará uma bibliografia atualizada sobre os debates envolvendo esses argumentos e contra-argumentos (...) nas seções correspondentes. Palavras-chave: identidade; indiscernibilidade; Princípio de Identidade dos Indiscerníveis; concebilidade. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Bibliography on Plato's "'Laws, "" 1920-1970: With Additional Citations through May, 1975. By Trevor J. Saunders. (New York: Arno Press, 1976. Pp. i + 60. $15.00) The Penguin Classics translator of the non-Socratic Laws, as Leo Strauss called them, has here compiled in a most usable way a thorough bibliography of books and articles about the Laws or parts of them. The section "Texts, Translations, and (...) Commentaries" properly excludes translations not made directly from the Greek. In previous centuries this would, also properly, have excluded many a famous or popular translation, such as Thomas Taylor's or Victor Cousin's, worked out from the text of M. Ficino's "first edition" in Latin. Given the state of the Greek text and the practice, inaugurated by Ficino, of improving upon the Greek in the translatioias, some notation about the literalness of the translations cited would have been of additional value. Section B, in thirty pages, is the largest and also deliberately the most selective in striving to limit itself to work concerned exclusively or primarily with the Laws. But it cannot avoid including much material about some aspect of Plato in general rather than about the Laws; this is especially true of the subsection, B1, on comprehensive accounts. Section B2, on the text and its tradition, has overwhelmingly more citations about the indirect tradition than about the texts themselves, an interesting indication of the current state of this question. The next subsections, to B12, divide according to subject matter. BI3 lists studies on the influence of the Laws. The last section, in twenty-four pages, is most valuable. It lists, by Stephanus page number, an abundance of discussions of individual passages from Book I through Book XII wherever these discussions, bibliographically speaking, may have occurred. Students of the Laws will be well served by, and most grateful to, Professor Saunders for this bibliography. I can only second the intent of his parting epigraph that sends us back to the study of the Laws themselves. But I must add that more explicitly detailed work appears to be required both on the difficulties the text itself presents to students of Plato (one thinks of A. Boeckh's analyses of the prose in Books I through III) and on those which arise when the Laws is contrasted--from the point of view of design and intellectuality--with those of Plato's works that are comparable, if not in number of pages, at least in scale of conception and monumentality. V. TEJERA SUNY at Stony Brook Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works. By Anthony Preus. (Hildesheim and New York: George Olms, 1975. Pp. ix + 404. DM.88) A reciprocal influence between Aristotle's philosophy and biology--if it could be demonstrated through step-by-step criticism and not merely asserted in generalities about functionalism--might help to explain both, and might also itself be philosophically interesting ; for it should clarify Aristotle's concepts of form, essence, universal, and species-concepts which have been mercilessly jumbled in the traditional interpretations. With the failure of Jaegerian developmental analyses, we can hardly now hope for help from detailed chronology. But a general dating of Aristotle's biological interest to the Assos-Mytilene period, when he was already aged forty, is accepted by most people (though not by Jaeger who [463] 464 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY put it at the end, nor by Ryle who put it at the beginning of Aristotle's career) and is the basis of Anthony Preus's contention in this book. For if Aristotle began serious biology only in middle life we could expect a tension between the antiphenomenal metaphysics of the Academy, which he had just left after twenty years there, and the kind of philosophizing and explaining that might seem demanded by living concrete organisms. Preus sets out to show such a tension, claiming on page 1 that "in P. A. and G. A. sometimes the philosophical position is bent to fit the observed facts, and sometimes the observations are adjusted to fit the philosophical position." The reader may be assured at once that this appalling accusation (which is repeated in the publisher's blurb) is not... (shrink)

An analysis of the sources of Wittgenstein’s picture theory — which include not only his moment of insight on reading a magazine story about the use of models in a traffic court, but also the work of Russell, Hertz, and Boltzmann — provides the basis for an exploration of Wittgenstein’s articulation of a pictorial conception of representation in his wartime notebooks and its crystallization in the Tractatus. A discussion of Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the picture theory and his notion of (...) a “philosophical picture” illustrates the fundamental reversal in his transition to his later conception of philosophy: instead of taking literal pictures as a guide to the nature of meaning, he came to regard philosophical theories as akin to expressing an aesthetic preference for a certain style of representation. Wittgenstein’s treatment of factual language in the picture theory is related to his Tractarian approach to logical form, and the role of the show/say distinction in his early conception of logic and language. Particular attention is given to the difficulties generated by the idea that the conditions for the possibility of a given domain of discourse cannot be described in language, but must be shown by the form of words in question. (shrink)